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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




WILLIAM ERNEST SCOTT,   §   
 Plaintiff,     § 
       §  
       § CIVIL NO: 4:09-cv-03991 
       §  
v.       §   
       §   
BILL PIERCE, et al.,    § 
       § 




AMICUS CURIAE’S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
 
 State inmate William Ernest Scott (TDCJ #576705) filed a pro se civil rights 
complaint alleging violations of his religious freedom in the state prison’s policy 
requiring an approved volunteer to supervise all religious activities by inmates. See 
Docket Entry (D.E.) 1. Scott seeks injunctive relief ordering the prison to allow 
him and other members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith to meet without 
volunteers when they are not available. (D.E. 23 at 3). A bench trial was held in 
this case on August 9, 2011. (D.E. 39, 41). In accordance with this Court’s order of 
November 1, 2011 (D.E. 47), defendants filed a post-trial brief on December 1, 
2011. (D.E. 51). In accordance with this Court’s order of November 1, 2011 (D.E. 
47), plaintiff filed a brief in response to the defendants’ post-trial brief on February 
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1, 2012. (D.E. 52). Amicus curiae Professor Leslie Griffin files this brief in 
accordance with this Court’s order of November 1, 2011. (D.E. 47, 48). 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
William Ernest Scott (TDCJ #576705) is an inmate incarcerated with the 
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) at the Huntsville Unit in Huntsville, 
Texas. (D.E. 1). In December, 2009, Scott filed this suit against Director of 
Chaplaincy Bill Pierce, Warden Charles O’Rielly and Chaplain Larry Hunt 
alleging that “[r]estricting religious meetings has denied me religious freedom” 
(D.E. 1 at 3). In particular, Scott, a Jehovah’s Witness, claimed that although other 
religious groups at the prison were allowed to conduct religious meetings without a 
volunteer present, Jehovah’s Witnesses were not. (D.E. 1 at 4). Scott argued that 
the prison defendants must “ensure equal treatment for all religions regardless of 
their own religious beliefs.” (D.E. 1 at 4). He then requested relief in the form of 
being allowed to meet without volunteers present in the same manner as other 
religious groups. (D.E. 1 at 4).  
In response to this Court’s Order for More Definite Statement (D.E. 5), Scott 
clarified that although Jehovah’s Witnesses were not allowed to meet without a 
“free world” volunteer present (D.E. 6 at 2), Muslims and Jews were (D.E. 6 at 5). 
Scott alleged that Chaplain Hart told him that federal lawsuits allowed the different 
rules for different religions in terms of the volunteer policy. (D.E. 6 at 5).  
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In its original motion to dismiss, the state characterized Scott’s lawsuit as 
“presumably pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-cc-1(a)(1)-(2).” (D.E. 
9 at 1) (emphasis added). State defendants further argued that the case should be 
dismissed because the plaintiff had failed to establish that the government had 
“substantially burdened” his religious practice as required by RLUIPA. (D.E. 9 at 
5, 6).  
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment argued that his Free Exercise 
Clause rights were violated (D.E. 11 at 1), and that the Jehovah’s Witnesses should 
be treated “as other similarly situated groups.” (D.E. 11 at 2).  
This Court dismissed defendants Pierce and O’Rielly from the lawsuit for 
lack of the requisite personal involvement. (D.E. 17). The remaining defendant, 
Chaplain Larry Hart, moved for summary judgment on the grounds that neither the 
Free Exercise Clause nor RLUIPA was violated in Scott’s case. (D.E. 19). The 
defendant acknowledged that although Plaintiff did not “clearly state…the exact 
law under which be brings suit,” (D.E. 19 at 5) he presumed that Plaintiff 
“intended to bring suit pursuant to the RLUIPA and the First Amendment.” (D.E. 
19 at 5) (emphasis added). Defendant then argued that Scott’s religion was not 
substantially burdened because the Jehovah’s Witnesses met fairly frequently and 
were also “free to attend any other Christian service.” (D.E. 19 at 10). Jehovah’s 
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Witnesses were also allowed to pray in their cells when no volunteer was present. 
Id.  
 In response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 
asserted possible Equal Protection Clause, Texas Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act [TFRA] and First Amendment Freedom of Religion violations. (D.E. 22 at 1).  
This Court denied the motions for summary judgment and ordered trial. 
(D.E. 23). A bench trial was held on August 9, 2011. (D.E. 39, 41). This Court’s 
order of November 1, 2011 ordered post-trial briefing. (D.E. 47). Plaintiff’s post-
trial brief asserted that the prison’s policy of compliance with the consent decree in 
Brown v. Beto, 4:74–CV–0069 (S.D.Tex.1977), (D.E. 19, Exh. E at 2), which 
allows Muslims to meet without a volunteer present while not allowing Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to do the same, violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. (D.E. 52 at 2).  
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE APPLIES TO THIS LAWSUIT 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains two Religion 
Clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.” U.S. Const., amend. I. The Establishment Clause applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
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303 (1940). The Establishment Clause requires “the principle of denominational 
neutrality.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). 
Neither this Court nor the parties have yet addressed the details of possible 
Establishment Clause violations in the prison’s volunteer policy. The defendants 
“presumed” that Scott was making a free exercise and a RLUIPA argument. (D.E. 
9 at 1). Scott referred to religious freedom and the First Amendment in his early 
pleadings. (D.E. 1). In his post-trial brief, plaintiff asserted that the prison’s policy 
of allowing Muslims to meet without volunteers while not allowing Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to do so violates the Establishment Clause. (D.E. 52 at 2).  
Both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause protect 
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause’s prohibitions are “inextricably 
connected with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause.” Larson, 456 
U.S. at 245. “Free exercise thus can be guaranteed only when legislators … are 
required to accord to their own religions the very same treatment given to small, 
new, or unpopular denominations.” Id.  
Because of the linkage of the Establishment Clause with religious freedom, 
this Court may consider the Establishment Clause implications of Scott’s lawsuit. 
The filings of pro se litigants are reviewed under a less stringent standard than 
documents prepared by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 
(1972); Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus pleadings 
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filed by a pro se litigant are entitled to a liberal construction that affords all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 521; 
Pena v. United States, 122 F.3d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Nerren v. Livingston 
Police Dept., 86 F.3d 469, 472 & n. 16 (5th Cir. 1996)). A reasonable inference 
from a lawsuit alleging First Amendment discrimination is that the Establishment 
Clause was violated. Moreover, plaintiff explicitly referred to the Establishment 
Clause in his post-trial brief. (D.E. 52 at 2).  
A. The Establishment Clause Requires Strict Scrutiny of Denominational 
Preferences. 
 
“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 
U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 
(1947) (no State may “pass laws which aid one religion” or that “prefer one 
religion over another.”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (“[t]he 
government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects.”); School 
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (“[t]he fullest 
realization of true religious liberty requires that government … effect no favoritism 
among sects … and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.”). The Supreme 
Court has stated that the prohibition against preferential treatment of religion is 
“absolute.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 255. By alleging that Muslim and Jewish prisoners 
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are preferred to Jehovah’s Witnesses in the volunteer policy, prisoner Scott has 
alleged an Establishment Clause violation by the state.  
Although the Supreme Court has identified various Establishment Clause 
tests that govern different settings, the rule of Larson v. Valente applies when a law 
discriminates among religions. See Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10-6273, 2012 WL 50636, 
at *11 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012). Larson has been applied in the prison setting 
because “[w]hen an institution provides religious accommodations to inmates, it 
must do so in a neutral manner.” Rouser v. White, 630 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1194 (E.D. 
Cal. 2009); id. at 1195 (the idea that Larson may apply in the prison context is 
supported by the Supreme Court’s approval of strict scrutiny in RLUIPA cases); 
see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723-24 (2005) (Like the Establishment 
Clause, RLUIPA does not allow the state to “differentiate among bona fide faiths” 
or “single out a particular sect for special treatment.”).   
Larson requires strict scrutiny. Once the government has set a policy of 
denominational preference, “that rule must be invalidated unless it is justified by a 
compelling government interest, [citations omitted] and unless it is closely fitted to 
further that interest.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 47; Rouser, 630 F.Supp.2d at 1195.  
Therefore in order to sustain different treatment of Muslims and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, TDCJ’s policy must be justified by a compelling government interest 
and closely fitted to further that interest. It is not clear that the government’s 
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invocation of the consent decree in Brown v. Beto, 4:74–CV–0069 (S.D.Tex.1977), 
can meet the compelling interest test in Scott’s case. Even if adherence to a consent 
decree is by definition compelling, moreover, the government’s action is probably 
not closely fitted to that interest.  
1. Consent decrees provide only a compelling interest to enforce the 
terms of the consent decree.  
 
The state’s apparent compelling interest in treating Muslim prisoners 
differently from Jehovah’s Witnesses is the consent decree in Brown v. Beto, 4:74–
CV–0069 (S.D.Tex.1977) (D.E. 19, Exh. E at 2). In Brown, Muslim prisoners filed 
a lawsuit alleging their religious freedom was violated by prison policies that 
allowed Protestants, Catholics and Jews to meet for worship while refusing similar 
meetings to Muslims. (Brown D.E. 1). The complaint alleged “prisoners of the 
Protestant, Catholic and Jewish Faiths [were] all accorded the right to worship 
according to their particular beliefs.” (Brown D.E. 1 at 3). Brown and other 
Muslim prisoners alleged that although Christians and Jews had access to a 
nondenominational chapel, Muslims did not. Moreover, the state provided 
religious counselors for Protestants, Catholics and Jews but not for Muslims. Id.  
The parties in Brown v. Beto entered into a consent decree. (D.E. 19, Exh. E 
at 2). Among the provisions of the decree was an agreement that:  
Whenever an ordained Islamic minister is unavailable at a particular time 
regularly scheduled for Islamic worship or study …, allow inmates 
professing adherence to the Religion of Islam to congregate under 
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appropriate supervision for the purposes of worship, study in the Islamic 
faith, Sunday School and other religious functions and activities as set forth 
hereinabove and hereinafter, with a leader designated from their midst; 
provided, however, that such inmate leader shall have previously secured the 
approval of an appropriate official of the Texas Department of Corrections, 
and provided further, however, that the Texas Department of Corrections 
shall not unreasonably withhold or delay such approval. (D.E. 19, Exh. E at 
4-5). 
 
The decree also “[a]llow[ed] adherents to the Religion of Islam at each unit of the 
Texas Department of Corrections equal time for worship services and other 
religious activities each week as is enjoyed by adherents to the Catholic, Jewish 
and Protestant faiths, and specifically, allow adherents to the Religion of Islam at 
least two (2) full hours of time for worship services or other religious activities 
each week, rather than the one (1) hour previously permitted.” (D.E. 19, Exh. E at 
6). 
“Compliance with a consent decree may certainly be a compelling interest.” 
Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 310 (3rd Cir. 2006); Cavalier ex rel. 
Cavalier v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 403 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(suggesting that a consent decree may provide a compelling interest although a 
lapsed consent decree does not). Obeying a consent decree may be viewed as a 
compelling interest for at least two reasons. “First, consent decrees are a kind of 
court order.” Citizens Concerned About Our Children v. Sch. Bd. of Broward 
County, Florida, 193 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999). Like other court orders, 
consent decrees must be obeyed. Those who disobey consent decrees may be 
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punished by contempt. “A potential for contempt alone….could provide a 
compelling interest.” Id. Therefore the state may have a compelling interest to 
obey the consent decree in Brown v. Beto.  
In a case involving a consent decree in a race discrimination case, the 
Eleventh Circuit identified a second reason why the government’s compliance with 
a consent decree may be a compelling interest. Because the consent decree in that 
case “rest[ed] on a foundation—redressing of past discrimination wrongs,” 
Citizens Concerned, 193 F.3d at 1293, the court concluded that the government’s 
compelling interest in redressing discrimination provided a second compelling 
interest to enforce the consent decree. Similarly, TDCJ may have a second 
compelling interest in enforcing the Brown v. Beto consent decree because it 
redressed religious discrimination against Muslim prisoners. (D.E. 19, Exh. E). 
As in Citizens Concerned, TDCJ may have two compelling interests in 
complying with the consent decree. First, it is a court order subject to contempt 
hearings. Second, it is a legal document redressing religious discrimination against 
Muslims. Therefore, the state has compelling reasons to enforce the policy 
protecting Muslims embedded in the consent decree in Brown v. Beto.  
The compelling interest, however, extends only to the terms of the consent 
decree; it does not mandate any particular treatment of non-Muslim, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses prisoners as in this case. See Police Ass’n of New Orleans Through 
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Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159, 1169 (5th Cir. 1996) (consent 
decree “cannot be used to justify actions aside from those mandated by its own 
terms”); see also Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(consent decrees are interpreted according to general principles of contract 
interpretation).  
2. A consent decree does not provide a compelling interest to violate the 
Constitution or other law. 
 
 “Compliance with a consent decree may certainly be a compelling interest, 
[citations omitted] but only if the decree mandates the … policy at issue.” Lomack, 
463 F.3d at 310. The consent decree in Brown mandates certain policies regarding 
Muslims, including their right to meet without volunteers present and to meet a 
certain number of hours a week. (D.E. 19-5, Exh. E at 4-6). It cannot justify 
religious discrimination against other groups. In the racial discrimination and equal 
protection contexts, courts have ruled that a consent decree prohibiting racial 
discrimination does not convey a right to discriminate against non-parties to the 
litigation. See Lomack, supra; Citizens Concerned, supra. Similarly, enforcing the 
consent decree on behalf of religious freedom for Muslims does not justify the 
denial of equal religious freedom to Jehovah’s Witnesses.  
Enforcing a discriminatory policy not required by the consent decree cannot 
provide a compelling interest to the government. See Police Ass’n of New Orleans, 
100 F.3d at 1169 (consent decree “cannot be used to justify actions aside from 
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those mandated by its own terms”); Citizens Concerned, 193 F.3d at 1293; 
Lomack, 463 F.3d at 310-11 (“any policy that exceeds the bare requirements of the 
order no longer closely fits the compelling interest because abandoning the policy 
is consistent with respecting the court, avoiding contempt liability, and righting the 
wrongs underlying the decree.”). The consent decree in Brown v. Beto requires 
certain treatment of Muslim prisoners. It was entered into because of concerns that 
Protestants, Catholics and Jews were receiving preferential treatment to Muslims in 
the state prisons. Its terms do not require that prison authorities provide Jehovah’s 
Witnesses with lesser rights, nor could the decree provide a justification for 
providing other religions with lesser rights (in this case the allegation that 
Jehovah’s Witnesses prisoners were subjected to unequal volunteer policies), 
because a consent decree cannot lawfully require a party to undertake unlawful 
action. See Lomack, supra; Citizens Concerned, supra. 
3. The government’s enforcement of a consent decree must also be 
“closely fitted” to its compelling interest.  
 
Larson strict scrutiny requires the government’s program to be “closely 
fitted” to furthering its compelling interest. Larson, 456 U.S. at 47. In Newby v. 
Quarterman, 325 Fed.Appx. 345 (5th Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit applied strict 
scrutiny to TDCJ’s volunteer policy in a case involving Buddhist prisoners who 
alleged they were not allowed to meet because there were no Buddhist volunteers. 
The court applied the “least restrictive means” prong of RLUIPA to conclude that 
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the “facts that Muslims regularly engage in communal worship without an 
approved religious volunteer is some evidence that the security and safety concerns 
identified by Texas can be addressed through less restrictive alternatives.” Newby, 
325 Fed.Appx. at 352; see also Inzunza v. Moore, No. 2:09-CV-0048, 2011 WL 
1211434, at *2 (N.D.Tex. 2011) (identifying possible alternatives that Muslim 
groups are “under visual and audio supervision at all times and the services are 
audio taped.”); McKennie v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, No. A–09–CV–906–
LY, 2012 WL 443948, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2012) (considering testimony 
that volunteer groups could be policed by roving officers, listening devices or 
video monitors).  
 Similarly, if Muslims regularly engage in communal worship without an 
approved religious volunteer present, there may be evidence that the government’s 
rule against Jehovah’s Witnesses’ meetings is not “closely fitted” to the 
government’s compelling interest in enforcing the consent decree. If there are 
alternative means of treating Muslim and Jehovah’s Witnesses prisoners without 
favoritism, then the Establishment Clause demands them.  
4. There is confusion in the record of this case about consent decrees. 
 
Plaintiff Scott has argued that, like the Muslim prisoners subject to the 
consent decree in Brown v. Beto, he and his fellow Jehovah’s Witnesses should be 
subject to the district court’s ruling in Hyde v. Texas Department of Criminal 
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Justice, 948 F.Supp. 625 (S.D.Tex. 1996). Dale Hyde was a Jehovah’s Witness 
prisoner who alleged that Witnesses were not allowed to meet without a volunteer 
present while Muslims were. Id. at 626. The district court ruled that Jehovah’s 
Witnesses should be allowed to meet “on the same conditions as adherents to other 
similarly situated groups.” Id.  
The state is correct that Hyde did not provide a consent decree that obligated 
TDCJ to provide relief to all future Jehovah’s Witnesses. See Proposed Conclusion 
of Law 17, D.E. 51 at 14 (Hyde “did not establish a TDCJ-wide consent decree for 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith group.”); Trial Transcript, D.E. 41 at 10 (“we argue 
that [Hyde] was not meant to be like Brown v. Beto. It was only supposed to apply 
to Mr. Hyde.”).  
However, the state is incorrect that Hyde has no relevance to Scott’s case. 
The state remains obligated to obey the First Amendment even if no consent decree 
for Jehovah’s Witnesses is in place. On the facts of Hyde’s case about the 
volunteer policy, the court identified a violation of religious freedom against a 
Jehovah’s Witness even though the consent decree was in effect for Muslims. 
Similarly, this Court may decide if Scott has proven violations of his own religious 
freedom. Plaintiff Scott enjoys the protection of the First Amendment even if there 
is no consent decree for Jehovah’s Witnesses. See Sundown v. Texas Dep’t of 
Criminal Justice-Correctional, No. H-07-1441, 2008 WL 1781065, at *1 
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(S.D.Tex. 2008) (although Hyde did not apply to petitioners, “the decision did 
apply the Constitution in a situation, making it persuasive in parallel situations.”).  
Scott, like Hyde, is entitled to “attend religious meetings of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses on the same conditions as adherents to other similarly situated groups.” 
(D.E. 51 at 16). Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses are similarly situated to each 
other for purposes of the Establishment Clause because the government is not 
allowed to favor one religion over another.  
B. Courts Have Disagreed Whether the Establishment Clause Always 
Requires Strict Scrutiny in the Prison Setting. 
 
As this Court acknowledged in its Memorandum and Order denying 
summary judgment, (D.E. 23 at 8-10), the Supreme Court has recognized that in 
the prison setting courts must be more deferential to prison officials than they are 
to defendants in non-prison constitutional rights cases. See Turner v. Safley, 482 
U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional 
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”). The Supreme Court has held that free exercise violations are subject to 
the “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” rule of Turner. Id.   
The Court has also held that other fundamental constitutional rights of 
prisoners may be subjected to the Turner test. In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210 (1990), for example, the Court applied Turner to a Due Process Clause 
challenge to a state prison’s policy of providing drugs to mentally ill patients 
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without their consent. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223-34 (Turner 
applies “even when the constitutional right claimed to have been infringed is 
fundamental, and the State under other circumstances would have been required to 
satisfy a more rigorous standard of review.”). 
The Supreme Court has not held that Turner applies to the Establishment 
Clause. Federal and state courts have disagreed whether Turner and Harper apply 
to Establishment Clause challenges. See Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 187-188 
(Tex. 2001) (“an overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered an 
inmate’s Establishment Clause challenge have declined to apply Turner in 
assessing the constitutionality of a prison’s actions”); id. at 188, n. 11 (collecting 
cases applying and not applying Turner to the Establishment Clause).  
The Texas Supreme Court’s reasoning is representative of why some courts 
have limited Turner to Free Exercise Clause challenges and not applied it in the 
Establishment Clause setting. “An Establishment Clause inquiry focuses not on 
whether an inmate has a right to do something, but rather on whether the 
government should refrain from acting in a particular way. [citation omitted]. In 
that context, the unique circumstances of imprisonment are of lesser relevance, and 
the risk that a court will improperly second-guess a prison official’s judgment 
concerning prison administration or security is less of a concern.” Id. at 189; see 
also Americans United For Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship 
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Ministries, 395 F.Supp.2d 805, 808 n. 4 (S.D.Iowa 2005) (“the Defendants request 
that the Court reconsider its ruling that Turner is inapplicable to Establishment 
Clause cases in the prison context. The Court will not do so unless presented with 
new, authoritative law which binds the Court on the matter.”).  
On the other hand, the cases that did not apply Turner to the Establishment 
Clause have largely involved government funding of prisons, or, as in Williams, 
state operation of a chaplain’s program for prisoners. Williams, supra; Americans 
United, supra. If this Court should decide that Scott’s case is about “a prisoner 
challenging a Department of Corrections directive,” and not about the 
government’s conduct in preferring one denomination to another, then the 
Establishment Clause analysis should be subjected to the rule of Turner, “which 
found that a prison regulation that impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights is 
nevertheless valid ‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” 
Salahuddin v. Perez, No. 99 Civ. 10431(LTS), 2006 WL 266574, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); see also Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
In Pugh v. Goord, Shi’a Muslim inmates alleged that the state favored Sunni 
Muslims by sponsoring Sunni services for all Muslims. Even though the court 
applied the Turner standard, it refused to grant the state’s motion for summary 
judgment because the plaintiff had provided evidence that other religious groups 
were accommodated and that alternative means of enforcing prison security existed 
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than combining all Muslims in one service. Id. at 496; but see Salahuddin, 2006 
WL 266574, at *9 (finding no reasonable factfinder could challenge state’s 
decision to place chaplains’ programs in a single administrative office). Even 
under Turner, this Court must determine if the accommodations available to 
Muslims under the consent decree suggest alternative, more neutral means of 
accommodating Jehovah’s Witnesses. See, e.g., Inzunza, 2011 WL 1211434, at *2 
(Muslim “services and the inmates are under visual and audio supervision at all 
times and the services are audio taped.”); id. at *6 (“each Muslim service is audio 
recorded”); McKennie, 2012 WL 443948, at *5 (considering testimony that 
volunteer groups could be policed by roving officers, listening devices or video 
monitors). 
Among the factual issues about Establishment Clause neutrality that this 
Court needs to clarify under Turner are whether Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses 
are treated equally under the last-minute cancellation policy, which allows the 
warden to substitute a staff member to supervise the prison service (D.E. 51 at 5); 
whether Sabbatarians’ access to replacement staff is impacted by their Saturday 
worship (D.E. 19 at 9); and whether Muslims and Jews have access to more 
services than the Jehovah’s Witnesses because they meet on Fridays as well as 
Saturdays (D.E. 6 at 5); see also Scott v. Pierce, No. H-09-3991, 2011 WL 445630, 
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at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (Scott alleges Muslim groups meet two hours on Fridays 
and Saturdays without a volunteer present).  
Turner also instructs district courts to inquire into “the impact 
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other 
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 
90. In the Fifth Circuit, “[w]hen accommodation of an asserted right will have a 
significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be 
particularly deferential to the informed discretion of correctional officials.” 
Freeman v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 862 (5th Cir. 2004). 
The court has explained that RLUIPA “is not meant to elevate accommodation of 
religious observances over the institutional need to maintain good order, security, 
and discipline or to control costs.” Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
In this case, prison officials testified that awarding Scott relief would have a 
“significant ripple effect” on prison staff because all 59 faith preferences at the 
prison could be expected to demand religious meetings without volunteers present. 
(D.E. 28, Exh. F); (D.E. 51 at 23-24); see also McKennie, 2012 WL 443948, at *10 
(granting McKennie an exemption to the religious-volunteer policy would open the 
door to other faith groups requesting similar exemptions.).  
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Unlike members of those other 59 faith preferences, however, Scott has 
alleged that Jehovah’s Witnesses are not allowed to mingle with non-Witnesses in 
religious services because the “Bible commands us to be separate from other 
religions.” (D.E. 6 at 4). Jehovah’s Witnesses are only 1% of the prison population. 
(D.E. 28, Exh. G). In contrast, subsets of the much larger Protestant and Muslim 
groups meet together (D.E. 28, Exh. G), and therefore may not need 57 separate 
volunteers for their meetings. Under RLUIPA, prison officials must do more than 
speculate that the accommodation of a religious practice will lead to safety and 
security problems. See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th 
Cir. 2003). In the Establishment Clause context, the state cannot speculate that 
every religious group at the prison is in the same situation as Scott in being 
precluded by his faith from combining in worship with non-Jehovah’s Witnesses 
religious groups.  
C. Establishment Clause Analysis Differs from RLUIPA’s Standards. 
Although there is overlap between a prisoner’s claims under the 
Establishment Clause and RLUIPA, the focus of the two complaints is different. 
The Establishment Clause violation consists of favoritism of one religion over 
another; the RLUIPA violation consists of a substantial burden upon the prisoner’s 
religious exercise.  
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RLUIPA provides that the government shall not impose a “substantial 
burden” on the prisoner’s religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-cc-1(a)(1)-(2). In 
reviewing and upholding TDCJ’s volunteer policy, the Fifth Circuit has focused on 
what constitutes a substantial burden under the language of the statute. It has ruled 
that the question of whether a volunteer policy substantially burdens religious 
exercise is a factual question to be decided case-by-case. See Mayfield v. Texas 
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 614-15 (5th Cir. 2008) (facts support 
finding of substantial burden); Newby v. Quarterman, 325 Fed.Appx. 345 (5th Cir. 
2009) (same); but see Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004) (no 
substantial burden): Odneal v. Pierce, 324 Fed.Appx. 297 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); 
Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2007) (same). Although the Fifth 
Circuit has validated the volunteer policy in some of these cases under RLUIPA, 
none of the Fifth Circuit’s cases upholding the state prison’s volunteer policy has 
assessed an Establishment Clause violation. See id. 
A statutory violation of RLUIPA, which consists of a substantial burden on 
religion, is not the same as a constitutional violation of the Establishment Clause, 
which consists of preferring one religion to another. Plaintiff alleged that Muslims 
and Jews are treated differently at the Huntsville Unit. There appears to be 
conflicting evidence about the treatment of Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
the record. See Defendant Hart’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in 
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Support (D.E. 19 at 12) (“As for the Muslim faith group, Plaintiff is correct. The 
Muslim faith group is permitted to meet without a volunteer or chaplain present.”); 
Defendant Hart’s First Supplemented Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in 
Support (D.E. 28 at 16) (same); Trial Transcript, D.E. 41 at 111 (testimony 
suggesting different rule is applied to Muslims); but see D.E. 28, Ex. D (custodian 
of records said no religious meetings of Muslims or Jews were held from 
December 1, 2008 to April 1, 2010). In ruling on an Establishment Clause 
violation, this Court must decide whether “the principle of denominational 
neutrality” was violated in the specific facts of the case. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In accordance with this Court’s order of November 1, 2011 (D.E. 47, 48), 
amicus curiae submits this brief and respectfully urges this Court to consider the 
Establishment Clause implications of William Scott’s lawsuit. 
 
    Respectfully submitted, this 28th day of February, 2012. 
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